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Abstract
InthispaperweanalyzeexecutivecompensationinGermanyfortheperiod2005-2009. We
use a self-collected dataset on compensation arrangements in German corporations to estimate
the impact of ﬁrm performance and ﬁrm risk on executive pay. To be in line with earlier
studies in this literature, we ﬁrst measure ﬁrm performance and ﬁrm risk based on stock market
returns. Our ﬁndings support the prediction from agency theory that incentive pay decreases
with ﬁrm risk. We ﬁnd, however, that stock market returns have no explanatory power in the
presence of accounting based performance measures. Based on accounting data we also ﬁnd a
positive impact of ﬁrm performance on executive pay and a negative relationship between ﬁrm
risk and incentive pay for our sample period. We conclude that shareholders use accounting
measures rather than stock market data to evaluate and pay for manager performance. We also
ﬁnd that with accounting data we can explain short-term bonus payments but not long-term
oriented compensation in German corporations.
JEL Classiﬁcation: G30, J33, M12
Keywords: Pay for Performance, Executive Compensation, Incentives
11 Introduction
The ﬁnancial crisis has brought much attention to executive compensation. In many compensation
contracts managers face incentives that link part of their pay to performance. With high compen-
sation even in years of economic downturn these remuneration arrangements came under scrutiny.
In particular, it was questioned whether managers face any downside risk in their compensation
schemes with bonus payments.
In this work we study the relationship between ﬁrm performance, ﬁrm risk and executive compen-
sation in Germany. Based on a self-collected dataset on compensation arrangements in German
corporations for the period 2005-2009, we analyze the impact of ﬁrm risk on the sensitivity of
executive pay to ﬁrm performance. We ﬁrst follow the previous literature in that we measure ﬁrm
performance and risk based on stock market data. Speciﬁcally we use stock returns as a measure
for ﬁrm performance and the variance of stock returns as a measure for ﬁrm risk.
Based on stock market data we ﬁnd empirical evidence for pay-performance sensitivity decreasing
in the riskiness of the ﬁrm. The pay-performance sensitivities that are implied by our estimation
results are of similar magnitude as the ones that previous studies estimated for other countries.
However, the estimation results with stock market data turn out to be not very robust. We ﬁnd that
stock returns lose their explanatory power when we control for ﬁrm performance measured with
accounting data.
Following this result, we repeat our analysis and measure both ﬁrm performance and risk with
accounting data. We argue that shareholders ultimately care about stock returns but may still base
executive pay on accounting numbers and not solely on stock market performance. The reason
could be that executives do not accept too much dependence of their remuneration on stock market
performance which they cannot inﬂuence as much as accounting ﬁgures. Our estimation results
are supportive to this hypothesis. We ﬁnd that changes in ﬁrm earnings have an economically
signiﬁcant effect on executive compensation and that the pay-performance sensitivity decreases
with ﬁrm risk.
Hence our ﬁrst contribution is to present a new dataset on executive compensation in Germany and
to estimate pay-performance sensitivities of managers in German corporations. For the years 2005-
2009, we conﬁrm the negative relationship between incentive pay and ﬁrm risk that is predicted by
theoretical literature on executive compensation and was previously documented in empirical lit-
erature based on U.S. data. Unlike previous studies we also estimate pay-performance sensitivities
2based on accounting data. Hence our second contribution is to estimate the relationship between
ﬁrm performance, risk and executive pay by matching compensation data with accounting data. In-
deed, we ﬁnd that the negative relationship between ﬁrm risk and incentive pay also holds for the
period 2005-2009. Finally, the structure of our data allows us to identify which component of vari-
able compensation drives pay-performance sensitivity. We ﬁnd that ﬁrm performance measured by
both stock market data and accounting data explains cash bonus payments quite well. However,
only stock market data can explain long-term oriented compensation in German corporations.
The remainder of this work is structured as follows. In the next section we brieﬂy review the ﬁnd-
ings of previous literature related to our study. We describe our self-collected dataset and present
some summary statistics in section 3. In section 4 we introduce our estimation methodology and
present our results. Section 5 presents some robustness checks. In section 6 we show some regres-
sion results testing for reverse causality. We conclude and give a brief outlook on future work in
Section 7.
2 Literature Review
In the literature the relation between executive compensation and ﬁrm performance is typically
modeled in an agency theory framework. The model setup is such that shareholders design com-
pensation schemes to align their interests with those of agents employed to run the ﬁrm. One
issue in such a framework is how manager compensation interacts with ﬁrm risk. There is a two-
sided relationship between ﬁrm risk and executive pay. Firm risk may determine if and how the
ﬁrm’s shareholders link management compensation to ﬁrm performance. However, the structure
of compensation may have an impact on the executive’s risk-taking decisions as well.
Because of the two-sided relationship between ﬁrm risk and manager pay, the theoretical literature
on ﬁrm performance, risk and executive compensation can be divided into two different strands.
First, there are theoretical predictions for the impact of ﬁrm risk on executive pay. Second, there
is theoretical literature on the impact of the structure of executive compensation on ﬁrm risk.
Similarly, because of this two-sided relationship, empirical studies on this subject have to account
for the issue of reverse causality.
The theoretical literature about the impact of ﬁrm characteristics on the structure of executive
compensation contracts centers around the question how the riskiness of the ﬁrm determines the
sensitivity of manager pay to ﬁrm performance. Holmstrom & Milgrom (1987, 1991) argue that
3this relationship between ﬁrm risk and incentive pay should be negative. They show that riskier
ﬁrms or ﬁrms in a more volatile environment should link the compensation of risk-averse managers
less to ﬁrm performance. The intuition behind is that it is costly for (diversiﬁed) shareholders to
compensate risk-averse managers for any risk transfer.
The empirical evidence on the impact of ﬁrm risk on incentive pay is mixed. There is some sup-
port for Holmstrom & Milgrom’s (1987, 1991) hypothesis that incentive pay is lower at ﬁrms with
higher risk. One study with supportive evidence is Aggarwal & Samwick (1999). They investigate
the impact of ﬁrm risk measured by stock return variance on the sensitivity of executive compen-
sation to ﬁrm performance (pay-performance sensitivity). They reﬁne the methodology of Jensen
& Murphy (1990) who estimate pay-performance sensitivities as well but do not explicitly account
for ﬁrm risk. In their sample of executives of U.S. corporations during 1993-1996, Aggarwal &
Samwick ﬁnd strong support that the elasticity of compensation is positive in stock returns, but
decreases, for a given return, in ﬁrm risk.
Aggarwal & Samwick (1999) ﬁnd the same result when they measure ﬁrm performance not with
stock market returns but with absolute changes in market value. Cichello (2005) reﬁnes this ap-
proach. He argues that one has to explicitly account for ﬁrm size when using the variance in market
value changes as a measure for ﬁrm risk. For CEOs of U.S. corporations during 1993-2000, he
ﬁnds that the negative relationship between ﬁrm risk and pay-performance sensitivity still holds
but that the latter is smaller for CEOs at larger ﬁrms1.
On the other hand, Core & Guay (1999) ﬁnd a positive impact of ﬁrm risk on incentive pay mea-
sured by the extent to which executives are given equity grants. They argue that monitoring costs
rise with uncertainty of the ﬁrm environment (and thus with ﬁrm risk) and therefore executives at
riskier ﬁrms are given more incentive pay. A similar argument is made by Prendergast (2002). He
surveys the empirical literature on the relationship between risk and incentives and concludes that
empirical evidence in support of Holmstrom & Milgrom’s (1987, 1991) prediction of a negative
relationship between ﬁrm risk and incentive pay is limited at best. His explanation for a positive
relationship is that shareholders of ﬁrms operating in environments with a lot of uncertainty (risky
ﬁrms) give managers more discretion over the choice of activities. The idea behind is that because
1We note that Aggarwal & Samwick’s (1999) results were further challenged in a working paper by Core & Guay
(2001). They also argue that Aggarwal & Samwick did not explicitly account for ﬁrm size. When they do so they ﬁnd
a positive relationship between incentive pay and ﬁrm risk. There was some debate about this issue in unpublished
work by Aggarwal & Samwick (2002) and Core & Guay (2002). Cichello (2005) argues, however, that Core &
Guay’s (2001, 2002) ﬁnding of a positive relationship between ﬁrm risk and incentive pay was simply driven by
multicollinearity.
4of this uncertainty shareholders are less conﬁdent to know how the management should operate the
daily business of the ﬁrm and therefore delegate responsibility. This delegation of responsibility
then is accompanied by output-based incentive pay and hence a positive relationship between ﬁrm
risk and incentive pay.
The second branch of theoretical literature on ﬁrm performance, risk and manager compensation
analyzes the reverse causality, namely the impact of compensation on the risk-taking behavior
of managers and thus indirectly on the ﬁrm’s overall risk exposure. Many contributions to this
literature center around the question whether executive stock options or option-like compensa-
tion components induce more managerial risk taking. For example, Hodder & Jackwerth (2007)
analyze the impact of option-like compensation contracts on the behavior of a hedge fund man-
ager. They conclude that if the fund manager has a contract including a high-water mark she will
increase the risk of the fund dramatically when the value of the fund is just below its high-water
mark2. However, Ross (2004) shows that granting options does not induce all risk averse managers
to take more risk. He ﬁnds that there is no compensation scheme that makes all utility maximizers
behave less risk averse. Hence, the effect of the compensation structure on risk taking is not easily
predictable and strongly depends on the manager’s preferences.
There is an extensive empirical literature that tests the impact of manager compensation on ﬁrm
risk. Cohen, Hall & Viceira (2000) test whether ﬁrm risk is driven by compensation characteris-
tics. They hypothesize that stock return volatility is driven by the manager’s elasticity of wealth
to stock returns. Their empirical approach delivers evidence that ﬁrm risk is indeed driven by
manager compensation. Instead of evaluating the behavior of the manager indirectly through stock
characteristics, Coles, Daniel & Naveen (2006) use more direct proxies for the manager’s actions.
For example, they analyze the impact of the manager’s sensitivity of wealth to changes in ﬁrm
volatility (vega) on R&D expenditures and on investments in property, plant and equipment to
approximate risky or rather conservative investment decisions, respectively. They ﬁnd that there
is a strong relation between incentives and the riskiness of the ﬁrm policy and that more option
holdings of managers lead to riskier ﬁrm strategies. Contrary to this, Lewellen (2006) ﬁnds that
option holdings may discourage risk taking. Instead of using compensation in monetary units she
measures CEO welfare as the certainty equivalent of wealth. She ﬁnds that manager compensation
has an economically meaningful effect on ﬁnancing decisions and that executive options tend to
2Since the manager will gain heavily, if the fund value passes the high-water mark, but does not incur a loss when
it stays below, excessive risk-taking is the optimal strategy for the manager. The intuition behind this result is the same
as for a simple stock option, where increasing the volatility of the underlying also increases the option value.
5discourage risk taking and leverage.
In a recent study Fahlenbrach & Stulz (2011) investigate whether managerial incentives inﬂuenced
performance of banks during the ﬁnancial crisis. They test whether banks with better aligned
incentives, approximated by higher managerial ownership in shares or higher wealth sensitivity
to stock returns, outperformed their peers in terms of stock returns during the crisis year 2008.
Using a sample of U.S. banks they ﬁnd no evidence that better incentive alignment led to better
performance in the ﬁnancial crisis.
Most empirical studies on executive compensation focus on managers in the United States. One
exemption is Kaplan (1994) who compares incentives of Japanese and U.S. executives. He es-
timates pay-performance sensitivities based on stock returns and accounting data, but does not
control for ﬁrm risk, like most earlier studies on executive compensation. Another study based on
non-U.S. data is Becker (2006) who exploits tax ﬁlings of Swedish executives to explore the rela-
tion between incentives and risk aversion. Based on the assumption that wealthier individuals are
less risk averse he ﬁnds that less risk averse managers face stronger incentives in their compensa-
tion arrangements. Finally, a recent study is Firth, Leung & Rui (2010) who investigate executive
pay in Chinese companies between 2000 and 2005. They ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly positive impact of
ﬁrm performance, measured by either stock returns or return on assets, on executive pay. They
also ﬁnd some evidence for a negative impact of ﬁrm risk, measured by the standard deviation of
the performance measures, on compensation. They do not, however, account for ﬁrm risk when
calculating pay-performance sensitivities.
3 Data Description
Most if not all empirical studies on executive compensation use Standard&Poor’s ExecuComp
database which is restricted to U.S. data. In this study we present empirical evidence on compen-
sation in German ﬁrms. We assembled a database that contains information on executive compen-
sation of corporations that are currently part of the Prime Standard market segment of the Frankfurt
Stock Exchange3. As of February 2011, the Prime Standard segment contains 361 corporations.
Our sample includes the 108 largest ﬁrms by market capitalization. To make our ﬁndings compa-
rable to those from studies based on ExecuComp data, we have hand-picked the respective data
3To be part of the Prime Standard segment, ﬁrms have to fulﬁll certain obligations concerning publication of
quarterly reports, ad-hoc disclosure rules and accounting standards.
6for German ﬁrms from annual reports. Our dataset covers the years 2005 to 2009 and contains
information on compensation of the management board members including the CEO.
Compensation Data
German law requires corporations listed in Germany to provide information on the compensation
structure of their board members for ﬁscal years starting after August 15, 20054. Some companies
released compensation data already for the ﬁscal year 2005. The dataset is almost complete for the
years 2006 to 2009. A small number of companies opted not to publish remuneration data5.
The collected sample contains a wide cross section of ﬁrms across industries and ﬁrm size and
provides information for all executives on the respective management boards. We eliminate an
observation from our initial sample whenever a manager is not on the board for the whole ﬁscal
year. For such observations our compensation data may contain payments that are associated with
the job change (e.g. severance payments). Often these payments cannot be identiﬁed in the data
and thus we remove such observations.
Moreover, some observations drop out when we match our compensation data with measures of
ﬁrm performance. For our basic speciﬁcation we calculate ﬁrm performance volatility measures
based on a stock price history of three years. Hence we need stock price data starting in 2002
and we cannot use compensation data from ﬁrms that went public after that year and thus have an
insufﬁciently long stock price history. Finally, to make sure our regression results are not driven by
outliers we exclude the observationsin the top and bottom 2 percent of the stock return distribution.
We are left with a ﬁnal sample of 1,652 data points for a total of 607 individual executives in 108
corporations. We have 79 executives with a complete time series of ﬁve years, 136 with four
subsequent years, 103 with three years, 115 with two years and the remaining 174 with only one
year on board6.
Table 1 in the appendix summarizes our data on the compensation structure of CEOs and non-
CEOs forthe wholesample period. Total compensationis thesum ofall compensation components
4This is governed in paragraph 4.2.4 of the German Corporate Governance Code.
5Before 2006 ﬁrms had to explicitly state why they did not follow this recommendation. In June 2006, the recom-
mendationwassubstitutedbytherulingthatﬁrmsarerequiredtopublishthisinformationunlessitisdecidedotherwise
at the general meeting by three-quarters majority. This explains why for most ﬁrms individualized compensation data
is available since the ﬁscal year 2005 but not before.
6For a second speciﬁcation with ﬁrm performance measured by accounting data some additional ﬁrms drop out.
The summary tables in this section are based on the ﬁnal sample we use for the ﬁrst speciﬁcation that requires stock
market data.
7an executive receives in a given year. We have information which compensation components are
short- and long-term. In particular we distinguish three different types of remuneration. First we
identify payments that are not performance related, such as the base salary, the value of company
cars and insurance payments. Our second compensation type, short-term compensation, are annual
cash bonuses that are paid out at the end of the ﬁscal year. Third, long-term compensation is the
value of shares and stock options granted as well as compensation based on long-term incentive
plans.
For the valuation of long-term components we rely on the numbers given in the annual reports.
Law requires ﬁrms to publish the value of long-term incentives at the time they are granted. Long-
term incentives can be stocks, options or grants from ﬁrm-speciﬁc long-term incentive programs.
The variety of such programs is quite large and may include non-standard payout structures with
grants in cash, deferred cash, equity, restricted or time vesting stock, stock appreciation rights or
similar types of awards. Since we do not have detailed information about these incentive programs,
we cannot calculate the value of such grants and have to rely on the numbers given in the annual
reports.
We only have information on shares and options granted in a single year, but not on the executives’
total holdings at the end of the ﬁscal year. This means that we cannot investigate the sensitivity
of the managers’ total ﬁrm-related wealth to ﬁrm performance. However, the available informa-
tion enables us to analyze the sensitivity of annual compensation to changes in ﬁrm performance.
Therefore we do not include in our compensation measures any payments that are related to pre-
vious years. For example, compensation from long-term incentive plans is often paid out with a
time lag of some years. Such remuneration is included in our compensation measure when it is
granted, not when lagged payouts are actually made. This way we make sure that we only capture
compensation that is directly related to performance during the respective ﬁscal year. Our data
does not include any payments to beneﬁt plans. Information on such payments is not available in
a standardized form. We share this deﬁciency with empirical studies based on ExecuComp data.
Table 1 shows that during our sample period total compensation for CEOs was in the range of
21,000 to 13 million Euro with a mean (median) value of 2.2 (1.5) million Euro7. Board members
other than CEOs received 1.5 million Euro on average. The average ﬁxed part of CEO compen-
sation was 687,000 Euro or 43 percent of total compensation, which is slightly more than the 41
7The wide range of CEO compensation reﬂects the diversity of ﬁrm size in our sample. The minimum of 21,000
Euro for a CEO of a young ﬁrm from the technology sector is clearly exceptional.
8percentage share for non-CEOs. With 42 percent for both CEOs and non-CEOs, the yearly cash
bonus accounted for the biggest share of total compensation. Long-term compensation appears to
play a much smaller role in executive remuneration schemes. The average share of such compo-
nents is 15 percent for CEOs and 18 percent for non-CEOs. However, there are many executives
who receive no long-term compensation at all8.
Tables 2 to 6 present summary statistics for each year separately. Whereas average CEO compen-
sation increased from 2005 to 2007, there was a sharp decline of 14 percent in 2008 and another
decline of 6 percent in 2009. With 19 percent in 2008 and 9 percent in 2009, this decline in total
compensation was even more pronounced for non-CEOs.
There was some change in compensation structure as well. The average cash bonus share of CEOs
increased from 42 percent in 2005 to 47 percent in 2007. In the two subsequent years this share
declined and was only 36 percent in 2009. A similar development was observed for non-CEOs.
Finally, the average share of long-term compensation changed little over time.
From Table 4 we see that in 2007 CEOs received on average almost half of their total compen-
sation as a cash bonus. The maximum share of this short-term incentive component is more than
80 percent for some executives throughout the years. This also implies that the minimum share
of ﬁxed compensation for some executives was as low as 6-9 percent in 2005-2007 and still no
more than 10-14 percent in 2008 and 2009. The importance of cash bonus payments in executive
compensation is also visible in the fact that only a small fraction of executives receives no cash
bonus. This fraction was between 3 and 7 percent during 2005-2009. In 2008 and 2009 a drop in
performance-related pay should not be surprising given that many ﬁrms performed poorly during
the ﬁnancial crisis. However, it is noteworthy that only 18 out of 347 and 27 out of 388 execu-
tives had to forgo bonus payments during the crisis years 2008 and 2009, respectively. Moreover,
there were ﬁrms with negative stock market returns in previous years, too. Despite the reduction in
shareholder value in such ﬁrms almost all executives received a cash bonus in all years 2005-2007.
This indicates that short-term bonus payments are not driven by the change in shareholder value
alone.
Tables 7 to 9 describe executive compensation in ﬁrms of different size measured by total assets.
On average, CEOs and other executive board members at small ﬁrms9 earn only 23-24 percent of
8Excluding these observations increases the long-term compensation shares to 27 percent and 28 percent, respec-
tively.
9We call a ﬁrm ”small” whenever its total assets in a given ﬁscal year are below 1,000,000,000 Euro. Firms around
the threshold of 1,000,000,000 Euro may thus belong to different size categories over time.
9what their peers at large ﬁrms10 earn. CEOs of small ﬁrms receive on average 55 percent of their
compensation as ﬁxed pay, whereas this number is 41 percent and only 33 percent for CEOs of
mid-size ﬁrms11 and large ﬁrms, respectively. Cash bonuses account for 35 (44) [47] percent of
total CEO compensation at small (mid-size) [large] ﬁrms. The average share of long-term oriented
compensation components is only 9 percent for CEOs of small ﬁrms but 20 percent for CEOs of
large ﬁrms. In sum, larger ﬁrms tend to pay more in total, a higher share as variable compensation
and more as long-term oriented compensation compared to smaller ﬁrms.
Finally, Table 10 shows how executive compensation at ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms differs
within our sample. We deﬁne ﬁnancial ﬁrms as ﬁrms in banking, insurance and real estate. With
an average total of 2.1 million Euro executives of ﬁnancial ﬁrms earn more than their peers at
non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms (1.5 million Euro). Relative to their peers at non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms, executives at
ﬁnancial ﬁrms receive a lower share of their compensation as a cash bonus (38 versus 42 percent)
and a higher share as stocks, options and long-term incentive pay (24 versus 16 percent). Hence
contrary to what one may expect from the political debate about bonus payments in the ﬁnancial
industry, our data does not indicate a more pronounced focus on short-term oriented compensation
in ﬁnancial ﬁrms compared to other ﬁrms. This ﬁnding in our data is also contrary to Houston
& James (1995) who ﬁnd that banking CEOs in the U.S. during 1982-1988 received a smaller
percentage of their total compensation in the form of options and stock compared to CEOs in other
industries. Similarly, Adams & Mehran (2003) ﬁnd for the period 1986-1996 less reliance on
stock options in U.S. bank CEO compensation contracts compared to CEO compensation in other
industries.
The summary statistics suggest that there are no substantial differences in the compensation struc-
ture of CEOs and non-CEOs. This holds throughout the years and across ﬁrms of different size
andindustry. However, therearedifferencesin compensation levelsbetweenCEOsand non-CEOs.
Therefore we will include a CEO dummy in our regressions. Also there are differences in com-
pensation level and structure over time and for ﬁrms of different size. Thus in our regressions we
have to account for time effects and ﬁrm size12.
10Firms with total assets above 10,000,000,000 Euro.
11Firms with total assets between 1,000,000,000 Euro and 10,000,000,000 Euro.
12However, since we estimate a model with executive ﬁxed effects and no executive in our sample moves from one
ﬁrm to another ﬁrm, we expect that any variable measuring ﬁrm size will be absorbed by the ﬁxed effects whenever
ﬁrm size does not vary much over the sample period of ﬁve years.
10Firm Performance Data
For estimating pay-performance sensitivities we match our compensation dataset with measures
for performance and risk of the companies. We use the stock return and earnings before interest
and taxes (EBIT) in the respective year as measures for ﬁrm performance. Since we hypothesize
that pay-performance sensitivity varies with ﬁrm risk, we also calculate the volatilities of these
performance measures.
We extract stock prices from Thomson Reuters’ Datastream database. These prices are adjusted
for stock splits and dividend payments. We further adjust stock prices for inﬂation and calculate
annual real stock returns based on 2005 price levels. Column 1 of Table 11 shows percentiles of
the return distribution for our sample period 2005-200913. Annual returns in the sample period
range from a loss of 74.5 percent to a gain of 144.9 percent. With 8.8 percent the mean is about
the same size as the median with 8.4 percent.
In order to compute the variances of stock returns we use monthly data. This ﬁrm risk measure
is based on the three-year period preceding the ﬁscal year for which the manager was paid. For
example, wematchexecutivecompensationdatafrom2008withﬁrmriskmeasuredbyvolatilityof
monthly stock returns from January 2005 to December 200714. We chose to base our ﬁrm volatility
measure on a three-year period because we think what matters for compensation contracts is not
ﬁrm risk in the year of compensation but rather the general riskiness of the ﬁrm’s operational
environment or the industry it belongs to. Moreover, excluding the year when the manager is
paid from the calculation of our measure for ﬁrm risk mitigates the reverse-causality problem of
managerial risk taking in the same year. We calculate real monthly returns and variances of the real
monthly returns and annualize our estimates. The distribution of the standard deviation of stock
returns is given in column 2 of Table 11. The standard deviation of returns ranges from 7.6 percent
to 57.8 percent. Mean and median standard deviations are 18.9 and 17.3 percent, respectively.
We use earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) as an alternative ﬁrm performance measure.
The data for this variable is also taken from Thomson Reuters’ Datastream database. Again we
standardize all values to 2005 price levels. Speciﬁcally, our performance measure is the difference
between EBIT of the current year and the previous year. The distribution of this performance
13Table 11 shows our ﬁnal sample we later use for estimating pay-performance sensitivities. The top and bottom 2
percent of the original stock return distribution are excluded to account for outliers. Moreover, this sample contains
only companies with a sufﬁciently long stock price history to estimate the variance of returns.
14This applies for companies whose ﬁscal year is the calendar year. If the ﬁscal year deviates from the calendar
year, we adjust the period for the variance calculation.
11measure is characterized in column 3 of Table 1115. The annual change in EBIT reaches from a
decrease of 3.5 billion Euro to an increase of 1.4 billion Euro. The difference between mean and
median annual change in EBIT is substantial. Whereas the median annual change in EBIT is 3.6
million Euro during 2005-2009, the mean annual EBIT change is -59.8 million Euro which reﬂects
the skewness to the left of the EBIT distribution.
Computing a risk measure based on EBIT is not as straight forward as with stock returns. One
issue is that EBIT is an annual variable which makes it difﬁcult to get a sufﬁcient amount of data
to estimate the variance. Using a very long history of EBIT data is also problematic. Since we
want to measure the ﬁrm risk at the time the manager is employed in the ﬁrm we should only use
more recent data. We try to balance this trade-off by using ten years of EBIT data to compute our
risk measure. Column 4 of Table 11 shows the percentiles of the distribution of this risk measure.
Comparing columns 1 and 3 of Table 11 reveals that over the sample period 2005-2009 more than
40 percent (but less than 50 percent) of ﬁrm-year observations exhibit negative ﬁrm performance
measured by either stock returns or annual changes in EBIT. However, when we compare the two
ﬁrm performance measures year by year we ﬁnd some distributional differences. In 2005 and
2006 only about 10 percent of our sample ﬁrms exhibited negative stock market performance. The
fraction of ﬁrms with negative stock returns increased to 40 percent in 2007 and soared to 90
percent in the crisis year 2008. In 2009 it was back at about 20 percent. Based on accounting
data, about 20 percent of ﬁrms generated negative earning changes in 2005 and 2006. This number
increased to 30 percent in 2007, 50 percent in 2008 and 60 percent in 2009. Thus when we measure
ﬁrm performance with accounting data we do not observe a deterioration in ﬁrm performance as
severe as the one in the crisis year 2008 observed in the stock market.
4 Estimation Methodology and Results
We estimate the relationship between ﬁrm performance and executive pay. Agency theory predicts
that this relationship is also inﬂuenced by ﬁrm risk. In the classical agency problem a principal
employs an agent to manage a project with an uncertain payoff. The agent can inﬂuence the project
payoff by exerting effort. Since the principal cannot observe the effort choice, he designs an incen-
15Again Table 11 shows our ﬁnal sample we later use for estimating pay-performance sensitivities. Here the top and
bottom 2 percent of the original distribution of annual changes in EBIT are excluded to make sure that our results are
not driven by the tails of this distribution. Moreover, the smaller sample size is due to (1) the longer EBIT history we
require for our risk measure based on EBIT data, and (2) the exclusion of ﬁnancial ﬁrms to account for the difﬁculties
in comparing accounting ﬁgures between the ﬁnancial industry and other industries.
12tive scheme to induce the desired effort. This can be achieved by linking the agent’s compensation
to the success of the project. In the basic principal-agent model developed by Holmstrom & Mil-
grom (1987, 1991) the principal is risk neutral while the agent is not. Therefore the agent demands
compensation for any risk she has to bear. This leads to the key prediction that the sensitivity
of compensation to the project’s performance is decreasing in the volatility of the project. In the
context of executive compensation this implies that a manager’s remuneration is less sensitive to
ﬁrm performance in riskier ﬁrms.
We ﬁrst test this theoretical prediction based on stock market data. We test whether compensation
is positively related to shareholder returns, and whether compensation is less sensitive to returns
in companies with higher return volatility. Unlike Aggarwal & Samwick (1999) and following
Core & Guay (2002) and Cichello (2005) we explicitly account for the impact of ﬁrm size on this
relationship. We then repeat our analysis with accounting data where we replace stock returns with
ﬁrm earnings as an alternative measure for ﬁrm performance.
Estimating Pay-Performance Sensitivities with Stock Market Data
Our analysis is based on Aggarwal & Samwick’s (1999) methodology to estimate the sensitiv-
ity of manager compensation with respect to ﬁrm performance. In particular, we estimate pay-
performance sensitivities with a panel regression model of executive pay on ﬁrm performance and
ﬁrm risk. In this speciﬁcation, executive pay is the total compensation of executive i at ﬁrm j
in year t and denoted by wijt. Our ﬁrm performance measure is the annual percentage return to
shareholders in year t, denoted by jt. We use the volatility of shareholder returns as a measure
for ﬁrm risk and follow Aggarwal & Samwick in that we standardize this volatility measure by
using the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the variance of returns, F(2
jt). The CDF is
calculated as the rank of 2
jt divided by the number of observations in our sample. We specify the








jt) + i + t + it; (1)
where i is an executive ﬁxed effect, t is a year dummy, and it is the error term16. Note that
by using the CDF of return variance we ensure that our estimates of 
2 are not affected by a
possible relationship between stock return variance and the level of compensation. The estimated
16In this basic speciﬁcation we do not explicitly control for ﬁrm size. However, executive ﬁxed effects should
capture ﬁrm size to some extent since no executive moves from one ﬁrm to another during our sample period.
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1 and 
2 can be transformed into pay-performance sensitivities at any percentile of the
distribution. The pay-performance sensitivity for a manager employed by a ﬁrm with a given stock
return variance is 
1 + 
2F(2
jt). Thus the pay-performance sensitivity at a ﬁrm with the median
variance of stock returns is 
1 + 
20:5, and the pay-performance sensitivities at ﬁrms with the





We hypothesize that compensation levels are positively related to ﬁrm performance and pay-
performance sensitivity is decreasing in ﬁrm risk. Thus we expect 
1 > 0 and 
2 < 0. The
positive effect of higher returns on compensation should be smaller at ﬁrms with more volatile
stock prices, everything else equal. We do not have a prediction for 
3 since the impact of ﬁrm risk
on the level of total compensation is not clear. For example, Lewellen (2006) shows that the impact
of ﬁrm volatility on compensation depends on the structure of the manager’s portfolio. Whereas
in-the-money options make the manager more averse to ﬁrm risk, out-of-the-money options have
the opposite effect. It thus depends on the structure of the compensation package whether the im-
pact of ﬁrm volatility on total compensation is positive or negative. Ultimately this is an empirical
question.
We ﬁrst estimate equation (1) with stock market data for the period 2005-2009. The estimation
results are given in column 1 of Table 12. In addition to equation (1) we include a dummy for
CEOs. As expected, the effect of being CEO on total compensation is positive and highly signif-
icant. The coefﬁcient of stock return, 
1, is highly signiﬁcant and has the expected positive sign.
The interaction term of return and volatility is also signiﬁcant, with a negative coefﬁcient 
2.
The estimation results in column 1 support our ﬁrst hypothesis. Our results indicate that managers
participate from positive stock performance, but this participation is lower in ﬁrms with higher
volatility. Hence we ﬁnd support for the prediction from the Holmstrom & Milgrom (1987, 1991)
model and conﬁrm the ﬁndings of Aggarwal & Samwick (1999) in our dataset. In the lower part
of Table 12 we report the median pay-performance sensitivity calculated as 
1 + 0:5
2. Based on
the ﬁrst speciﬁcation we calculate a median pay-performance sensitivity of 31.59. This means that
for a 1 percent increase in ﬁrm value a manager at the ﬁrm with median variance in our sample
receives an additional 32,000 Euro17
17The maximum pay-performance sensitivity is 428.04 which implies that the manager at the ﬁrm with the lowest
varianceinoursamplereceivesanadditional428,000Euro. Basedontheestimatedcoefﬁcientswecalculateanegative
minimum pay-performance sensitivity. This, however, implies that we estimate for a manager employed at the ﬁrm
with maximum variance (risk) in our sample a reduction in compensation for an increase in ﬁrm value. Obviously this
14Next we account for the criticism raised by Core & Guay (2002) and Cichello (2005). They
ﬁnd that it is essential to explicitly control for ﬁrm size when looking at the relationship between
incentive pay and ﬁrm risk because of the observed negative relationship between incentive pay
and ﬁrm size. This empirical ﬁnding is already documented by Jensen & Murphy (1990) who
ﬁnd that executives at larger ﬁrms have lower pay-performance sensitivities. To account for this
concern we add a measure for ﬁrm size to the right side of equation (1).
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 12 show the results. We add to equation (1) two alternative measures
for ﬁrm size. Total assets (column 2) is signiﬁcant18. The coefﬁcients of stock return and the cross
term remain signiﬁcant but change in value. This makes pay-performance sensitivities smaller and
we end up with a negative estimate even for the ﬁrm with median risk in our sample. The number
of employees (column 3) turns out to be insigniﬁcant. Hence we ﬁnd that our results are not driven
by a ﬁrm-size effect but pay-performance sensitivities based on stock market data are severely
overestimated when we do not account for ﬁrm size.
We found the proposed relationship between executive pay, ﬁrm risk and ﬁrm performance mea-
sured by stock market returns. However, the estimated pay-performance sensitivities turned out to
be not very robust to changes in the speciﬁcation. Moreover, our ﬁndings do not necessarily imply
that shareholders indeed use stock market performance to judge and pay executive performance.
They may use other measures such as accounting ﬁgures that are likely to be correlated with stock
market performance and may truly drive our results. To test for this we add to the right side of
equation (1) earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) as another measure for ﬁrm performance.
Speciﬁcally, we add the yearly absolute change in EBIT at ﬁrm j in year t (measured in thousands
of 2005 Euros at the end of the ﬁscal year).
Column 4 of Table 12 shows the impact on our previous results. The change in yearly EBIT
turns out to be a highly signiﬁcant explanatory variable for executive compensation whereas stock
market returns no longer have explanatory power19. Therefore in the next section we reestimate the
link between ﬁrm performance and executive pay by measuring ﬁrm performance and risk based
on accounting data.
is rather a technical result and we will focus on median pay-performance sensitivities. In fact, Aggarwal & Samwick
(1999) and some other empirical studies come up with negative estimates for minimum pay-performance sensitivities
as well.
18The negative sign of the ﬁrm size coefﬁcient is surprising. However, as we argued above, ﬁrm size should be
captured already by the ﬁxed effects. When we leave out executive ﬁxed effects the coefﬁcient turns positive.
19Note that we still control for ﬁrm size in this speciﬁcation. The impact of EBIT on total pay is not simply a ﬁrm
size effect.
15Estimating Pay-Performance Sensitivities with Accounting Data
Ultimately we expect shareholders to be most concerned about returns from their investment in
stock. Hence it is straightforward to argue that shareholders remunerate managers based on stock
return performance. However, executive compensation contracts may be based on other perfor-
mance measures as well. One reason for such contracts could be that managers do not accept to be
paid based on stock market returns which are not as directly inﬂuenced by manager performance
as accounting results. Shareholders may agree to such contracts because it is reasonable to expect
ﬁrm performance measured by accounting numbers to be eventually reﬂected in stock market per-
formance. Not only our ﬁnal result from nthe previous section but also Kaplan (1994) is empirical
evidence for this reasoning. In his comparative study on executive compensation in Japan and the
United States, he ﬁnds that in the presence of ﬁrm performance measures from accounting (such
as pretax income), stock returns lose much of their explanatory power for executive compensation.
Instead of stock market returns we now use earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) as a measure
for ﬁrm performance. Speciﬁcally, we redeﬁne jt in equation (1) as the yearly absolute change in
EBIT at ﬁrm j in year t (measured in thousands of 2005 Euros at the end of the ﬁscal year)20. Ac-
cordinglywemeasureﬁrmriskbytheCDFofEBITvolatilitymeasuredbythevariationofchanges
in EBIT. In this speciﬁcation we exclude ﬁrms in the ﬁnancial industry (banking, insurance, real
estate) since EBIT is not comparable between ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms21.
Column 1 of Table 13 shows the regression results based on 1188 observations from the whole
sample period 2005-200922. The coefﬁcients of ﬁrm performance (absolute change in EBIT) and
the cross term of ﬁrm performance and ﬁrm risk have the expected signs. Hence, we ﬁnd the
predicted relationship between ﬁrm performance, risk and compensation when we measure ﬁrm
performance and ﬁrm risk based on accounting data. In columns 2 and 3 of Table 13 we control for
ﬁrm size and add to our regression total assets and the number of employees, respectively. None
of these control variables is signiﬁcant. Median pay-performance sensitivities are again shown in
the lower part of the table. Based on accounting data, we estimate that an executive board member
at the ﬁrm with median risk receives an additional 312 Euro for a 1,000,000 Euro increase in ﬁrm
20Theoretically the market value of a ﬁrm is the present value of future cash ﬂows. We tried the absolute value of
yearly EBIT as a ﬁrm performance measure but did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant impact on compensation. Therefore we use
the yearly change in EBIT instead. We ﬁnd that shareholders measure and reward executive performance based on
EBIT increases and not on the absolute value of EBIT itself.
21Our previous ﬁnding in column 4 of Table 12 does not change when we exclude ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
22We require 10 years of observations to calculate a meaningful measure for the variation in yearly EBIT. This
restriction, however, combined with the exclusion of ﬁnancial ﬁrms reduces our sample size from 1652 to 1188
observations.
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It is not straightforward to compare our pay-performance sensitivity estimate based on accounting
data with those based on stock market data. But how do our pay-performance sensitivity estimates
compare with previous results in the literature? In fact, pay-performance sensitivities estimated
in other studies differ widely as well. Obviously estimates are very sensitive to the deﬁnition of
executive pay or wealth. Jensen & Murphy (1990) estimate an average $0.30 increase in CEO pay
(salary plus bonus) and a total increase of $3.25 in CEO wealth for a $1,000 increase in shareholder
value in their sample of U.S. executives during 1974-1986. When they split their sample by market
value, they estimate for a $1,000 increase in shareholder value an average increase of $1.85 and
$8.05 in CEO wealth at ﬁrms in the top and bottom half of the sample, respectively. Kaplan
(1994) ﬁnds even smaller pay-performance sensitivities. For U.S. (Japanese) CEOs in 1981-1989
he estimates a $0.015 (¥0.007) increase in salary and bonus for a $1,000 (¥1,000) increase in
shareholder value23.
Aggarwal & Samwick (1999) ﬁnd higher pay-performance sensitivities. Based on a least-squares
regression with executive ﬁxed effects they estimate a change in wealth of $69.41 for CEOs and
only $8.74 for non-CEOs per $1,000 increase in market value at the ﬁrm with median risk in their
sample of U.S. companies during 1993-1996. The median pay-performance sensitivity of CEOs
(non-CEOs) is only slightly lower at $58.61 ($5.78) per $1,000 when option holdings are excluded.
Estimates drop much more when only ﬂow compensation is considered and not the ownership of
stock and stock options. In particular, Aggarwal & Samwick ﬁnd that pay-performance sensitivity
resulting only from ﬂow compensation is about 5 percent of the overall estimates. Cichello (2005)
estimatesforCEOsofU.S.corporationsduring1993-2000pay-performancesensitivitiesatmedian
risk ﬁrms in the range from a $6.36 (large ﬁrms) to a $26.31 (small ﬁrms) change in CEO wealth
for a $1,000 increase in ﬁrm value24. When he excludes option holdings, these numbers drop to
the range $3.84-$9.15.
It is difﬁcult to ﬁnally compare our estimates with previous ﬁndings, since these are usually based
on U.S. data and from earlier periods. In our ﬁrst speciﬁcation based on stock market data we
followed Aggarwal & Samwick (1999) and did not explicitly control for ﬁrm size. We estimated
a pay-performance sensitivity of 32,000 Euro for a 1 percent increase in shareholder value at the
23These (low) estimates do not include incentives from stock and option grants and holdings though.
24When applying median regression analysis instead of least squares with executive ﬁxed effects, Aggarwal &
Samwick (1999) estimate with a change in wealth of $14.52 per $1,000 increase in market value pay-performance
sensitivities of similar economic magnitude.
17median risk ﬁrm in our sample. This 1 percent increase in shareholder value at the median risk
ﬁrm corresponds to roughly 17 million Euro. Hence we can translate our estimate into a 1.9
Euro increase in CEO pay per 1,000 Euro increase in shareholder value. Since our measures of
executive compensation correspond to what Aggarwal & Samwick (1999) call ﬂow compensation
excluding executive wealth and option holdings, this estimate is of a similar order of magnitude as
their estimates. When we explicitly account for ﬁrm size as Cichello (2005) does, our estimated
pay-performance sensitivities become very small and even at the median risk ﬁrm we calculate
a negative value which cannot be reasonably interpreted. When we control for earnings as an
alternative measure for ﬁrm performance we cannot calculate any pay-performance sensitivity
since our coefﬁcient estimates based on stock market data were no longer signiﬁcant.
Based on accounting data, our estimate for pay-performance sensitivity was 312 Euro for a 1 mil-
lion Euro increase in ﬁrm EBIT. We are aware of only one study that explicitly uses accounting
data to estimate pay-performance sensitivities. Jensen & Murphy (1990) estimate that CEOs re-
ceive $0.18 for each $1,000 increase in annual accounting income. This is of a similar economic
magnitude as our estimate of 0.312 Euro per 1,000 Euro increase in EBIT. However, these es-
timates in the literature result from U.S. data from the 1980s. We can conclude, however, that
we ﬁnd the same relationship between ﬁrm performance, ﬁrm risk and executive pay as previous
studies did.
To sum up, we ﬁnd a positive impact of a ﬁrm’s stock market performance on executive compen-
sation and a negative impact of ﬁrm risk measured by stock market volatility on incentive pay.
These results disappear after controlling for EBIT as an alternative ﬁrm performance measure. We
can reestablish our previous results when we measure ﬁrm performance and ﬁrm risk based on ac-
counting data and ﬁnd support for the hypothesized relationship between executive compensation,
ﬁrm performance and ﬁrm risk in German corporations during 2005-2009.
Estimating Performance Sensitivities for Compensation Components
So far the dependent variable in our regressions was total compensation of executive i at ﬁrm j
in year t. Based on total compensation we estimated pay-performance sensitivities. Actually our
dataset allows us to look in more detail at the individual components of total compensation. We
may differentiate between various compensation components to ﬁnd out which (variable) compen-
sation type drives pay-performance sensitivity. In this subsection we estimate the sensitivities of
18different compensation components to ﬁrm performance. This is also a ﬁrst robustness check for
the overall pay-performance sensitivities calculated above.
In a ﬁrst step, we replace total compensation, wijt, in equation (1) with variable compensation
(total compensation minus ﬁxed salary and other non-variable compensation). This speciﬁcation
is truly a robustness check for our previous ﬁndings. Only the variable part of total compensation
can be sensitive to ﬁrm performance anyway. Thus choosing variable pay instead of total compen-
sation should yield very similar results in terms of pay-performance sensitivities. In a second step,
we split variable compensation and replace it ﬁrst with short-term variable pay (cash bonus) and
second with long-term oriented variable pay (stock, options, incentive plans).
Estimation results based on stock market data show that stock returns and the cross term of returns
and ﬁrm risk are signiﬁcant and have the expected signs in all three speciﬁcations (not presented).
However, once we control again for our accounting-based performance measure EBIT, stock re-
turns are no longer capable of explaining neither total variable pay, nor cash bonuses or long-term
compensation. Estimation results based on accounting data as the explanatory input are summa-
rizedinTable14. Column1showstheresultsforequation(1)speciﬁedwithvariablecompensation
as the dependent variable and ﬁrm size as an additional control variable. As expected the coefﬁ-
cients of EBIT and the cross term are of comparable size as the ones estimated in the regression
with total compensation in Table 13. This not surprising given that the variable part of total com-
pensation is designed to be determined by ﬁrm performance. With 286 Euro for a 1,000,000 Euro
increase in EBIT, the median pay-performance sensitivity is of similar economic magnitude as the
312 Euro calculated from Table 13.
Column 2 of Table 14 shows estimation results for the cash bonus as the dependent variable. EBIT
andcrosstermareagainsigniﬁcantandhavetheexpectedsign. Thesizeofthecoefﬁcientestimates
are about half as large as the ones in the estimation of total variable pay (column 1). The median
pay-performance sensitivity suggests that a manager receives as a cash bonus an additional 215
Euro for a 1,000,000 Euro increase in EBIT.
Column 3 of Table 14 shows that we cannot explain long-term compensation based on accounting
datafromtheimmediatelyprecedingyear25. Weconcludethatshort-termvariablepay(cashbonus)
but not long-term variable compensation determines the sensitivity of manager compensation to
25There are several executives who do not receive any long-term compensation at all. Excluding these observations





We perform several robustness checks. The ﬁrst test considers alternative ﬁxed effects. In our basic
speciﬁcation we use individual ﬁxed effects for each executive because of the selective sample we
collected. We expect much of the variation in compensation within our sample of executives to be
due to individual characteristics. These could be age or work experience (observable but not part
of our dataset) and also factors such as bargaining power (not observable). Executive ﬁxed effects
should capture such individual characteristics we cannot explicitly account for.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 15 show regression results for our speciﬁcation based on stock market
data with ﬁrm-level and industry-level ﬁxed effects, respectively. In both speciﬁcations we include
total assets as a measure for ﬁrm size. The coefﬁcients of stock return and the cross term remain
signiﬁcant. Note that the coefﬁcient of total assets has the expected positive sign in the industry
ﬁxed effects speciﬁcation (column 2) but is signiﬁcant and negative in the speciﬁcation with ﬁrm-
level ﬁxed effects (column 1). We rather expected ﬁrm size to be insigniﬁcant in a speciﬁcation
with ﬁrm-level ﬁxed effects since ﬁrm size should not vary much over the short period of ﬁve
years. Nonetheless, ﬁrm-level ﬁxed effects should capture ﬁrm size to a large extent and we are
not too concerned about the negative coefﬁcient sign of total assets. Hence our basic result with
executive ﬁxed effects can be conﬁrmed with alternative ﬁxed effects.
Our next robustness tests concern the risk measure. In our ﬁrst speciﬁcation based on stock market
data we compute the variance of monthly stock returns over a three-year horizon and standardize it
by use of the CDF. To test the robustness of our results we modify this procedure by (1) calculating
the variance based on weekly instead of monthly stock market data, (2) calculate the variance over
a four- instead of a three-year horizon, and (3) use the variance of stock returns instead of the CDF
thereof. All our results remain valid with one of the ﬁrst two modiﬁcations (not reported). When
we do not standardize the variation in ﬁrm risk by the CDF, however, the explanatory variables that
we use to calculate pay-performance sensitivities, stock return and the cross term of stock return
and ﬁrm risk, are no longer signiﬁcant at 10 percent (not reported). Thus we conclude that we need
the CDF to reduce the huge variation across our sample in the variance term .
20Finally, we test whether our results hold when we measure stock market performance relative to a
peer group. Often manager compensation contracts include ﬁrm performance evaluation relative
to a ﬁrm’s peer group. The obvious goal of applying peer-group related performance measures is
to make sure managers are not paid for running the company during good times (pay for luck) but
for truly outperforming the market.
We lack the information whether ﬁrms in our sample pay managers for outperforming a peer
group. Hence we also lack information how such peer groups are deﬁned. Anecdotal evidence
from annual reports suggests that peer groups consist of other ﬁrms that are of similar size and/or
belong to the same industry. On top of being Prime Standard ﬁrms, the majority of ﬁrms in our
sample also belongs to either the DAX, MDAX, SDAX or TecDAX indices of the Frankfurt Stock
Exchange. Within the DAX, MDAX and SDAX indices ﬁrms are from different industries but
similar in terms of ﬁrm size measured by market capitalization26. TecDAX ﬁrms belong to the
technology sector27. As a proxy for peer group returns we use these index returns and compute a
ﬁrm’s relative stock market return as the difference between its stock return and the corresponding
index return.
We do not report our estimation results here because benchmark returns relative to index returns
have no explanatory power for executive compensation in our sample. This suggests either that
executives are mainly paid for absolute and not for relative performance or that companies deﬁne
peer groups differently. Indeed we know from annual reports that some large ﬁrms deﬁne a relevant
peer group of only a few close national and international competitors which do not belong to our
sample. Thus more work on relative performance pay in German ﬁrms is required.
In Table 16 we present robustness checks for our second speciﬁcation based on accounting data. In
columns 1 and 2 of Table 16 we present estimation results based on speciﬁcations with alternative
ﬁxed effects. The coefﬁcients of EBIT and the cross term of EBIT and the risk measure (CDF) are
signiﬁcant with the expected signs for both types of ﬁxed-effects speciﬁcations. As expected total
assets as a measure for ﬁrm size is signiﬁcant only in the industry-level ﬁxed-effects estimation
and not in the speciﬁcation with ﬁrm-level ﬁxed effects.
We further replaced the CDF with the variance itself. Again we ﬁnd that our results change. We
believe we need the CDF to account for the huge variation in ﬁrm size within our sample which is
26The DAX index includes the 30 largest German companies in terms of order book volume and market capitaliza-
tion. The MDAX contains 50 companies that rank immediately below the DAX, excluding the technology sector. The
SDAX contains the next 50 below the MDAX shares.
27The TecDAX consists of the 30 largest technology ﬁrms below those included in the DAX.
21reﬂected in the variance in EBIT changes.
In sum, apart from replacing the CDF with the variance itself, our robustness tests yield support
for the identiﬁed positive relationship between ﬁrm performance and executive compensation and
the negative impact of ﬁrm risk on pay-performance sensitivity.
6 Reverse Causality?
Within the literature on the interaction between ﬁrm performance, risk and executive compensa-
tion, our study belongs to the literature that analyzes the impact of ﬁrm risk on the structure of
executive compensation contracts. We noted above that there is truly a two-sided relationship. Not
only may ﬁrm risk determine how executives are paid. There is theoretical work and empirical
evidence that causality runs in the other direction as well. How managers are paid may determine
how much and what risk they take and this is likely to impact the riskiness of the ﬁrm. This raises
the concern that our results are driven by reverse causality.
We found a negative impact of ﬁrm risk on the use of incentive pay in German corporations. We
took this as support for the theoretical prediction that risk averse managers need to be paid for
any risk transfer and thus wage costs of incentive schemes are more expensive in riskier ﬁrms.
However, the negative relationship between ﬁrm risk and incentive pay could also be driven by
incentives inducing lower managerial risk taking. Risk averse managers with a high share of
variable pay that is closely linked to ﬁrm performance may be less willing to take risks and thus
lower the ﬁrm’s overall risk exposure. We want to test for this concern by regressing ﬁrm risk
on the manager’s lagged exposure to variable pay. Since risk is deﬁned on the ﬁrm level, our
explanatory variables have to be ﬁrm-year observations. Hence we specify the following equation:
jt = 1ppsjt 1 + 2wjt 1 + 3sjt + j + t + jt: (2)
In this speciﬁcation jt is the variance of weekly stock market returns during year t which we use
as our measure for ﬁrm risk. As explanatory variables we use the pay-performance sensitivity,
ppsjt 1, at ﬁrm j in year t   1 that we calculated from our basic estimation results in column 1 of
Table 1228. We add the average of total compensation of board members at ﬁrm j, wjt 1, to control
for any effect of the size of total compensation on risk taking and control for ﬁrm size by adding
28Note that ppsjt 1 itself was estimated based on data from the three years preceding year t   1.
22total assets sjt. We further include j as a ﬁrm ﬁxed effect and t as a year dummy.
If our previous ﬁnding of a negative impact of ﬁrm risk on the use of incentive pay was driven
by reverse causality, we would expect a negative coefﬁcient 1 in equation (2). Our estimation
results in column 1 of Table 17 show that this is not the case. The coefﬁcient of pay-performance
sensitivity in t 1 is positive and signiﬁcant at 5 percent. Thus if at all this result argues in favor of
a positive impact of pay-performance sensitivity on ﬁrm risk in the subsequent year but certainly
does not hint to a reverse causality problem in our original speciﬁcation.
Thus we ﬁnd a (weakly) signiﬁcant positive impact of incentive pay on ﬁrm risk. Next we examine
whether there is an impact on stock returns. We replace ﬁrm risk, jt, in equation (2) with stock
returns of ﬁrm j in year t and run the corresponding regression. Column 2 Table 17 shows that
there is no signiﬁcant impact. Hence we ﬁnd some evidence for a positive impact of incentive pay
in year t   1 on ﬁrm risk in year t but we ﬁnd no evidence for any effect of incentive pay in year
t   1 on stock returns in year t.
Unfortunately, we cannot repeat this reverse causality check for our results based on accounting
data since we cannot construct our risk measure for one year based on EBIT data. However, we
replace jt in equation (2) with the increase in EBIT of ﬁrm j in year t as an alternative measure
for ﬁrm performance. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant impact of incentive pay on ﬁrm performance when
the latter is measured with accounting data (results not reported).
Note that in all speciﬁcations in Table 17 we control for the average of total compensation of
board members at ﬁrm j. Interestingly, we ﬁnd (albeit only weakly signiﬁcant) evidence for the
compensation level having a negative impact on ﬁrm performance measured by either stock returns
(Table 17, column 2) or with accounting data (results not reported).
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper analyzes the impact of ﬁrm performance and risk on executive compensation in German
corporations. We use a self-collected dataset to estimate incentives measured by the sensitivity of
executive pay to ﬁrm performance. Based on stock market returns as a measure for ﬁrm perfor-
mance we estimate pay-performance sensitivities for the period 2005-2009. When we control for
ﬁrm earnings as an alternative performance measure, however, stock return lose their explana-
tory power for executive compensation. We then measure ﬁrm performance and risk based on
accounting data and reestimate pay-performance sensitivities. We ﬁnd that ﬁrm performance has
23an economically signiﬁcant positive impact on executive pay and that pay-performance sensitivity
is decreasing in ﬁrm risk.
We do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship between executive compensation and ﬁrm performance
measured by stock returns when we control for ﬁrm earnings. Hence we doubt that stock returns
are the actual measure shareholders use to evaluate and compensate manager performance. Based
on accounting data we estimate that a manager at the ﬁrm with median risk in our sample re-
ceives an additional 312 Euro for an increase in ﬁrm earnings of 1,000,000 Euro. In fact, matching
compensation data with accounting data is not new. For example, Lambert & Larcker (1987) em-
ploy different accounting measures to explain executive compensation. Jensen & Murphy (1990)
use accounting measures to estimate pay-performance estimates but do not account for ﬁrm risk.
However, to our best knowledge this study is the ﬁrst to identify the relationship between ﬁrm
performance, ﬁrm risk and executive pay based on accounting data. We argue that accounting data
may deliver more reliable estimates of pay-performance sensitivities than stock market data.
The structure of our dataset allows us to analyze the relationship between ﬁrm performance and the
various components of total compensation. Based on accounting data we can explain cash bonus
payments but not long-term oriented compensation in German corporations. Finally, to control for
reverse causality that may result from the two-sided relationship between manager compensation
and ﬁrm risk, we estimate the impact of (lagged) pay-performance sensitivity on ﬁrm risk and
performance. We are not concerned that our results are driven by reverse causality.
This work calls for future research. First, we take away from our analysis the fragility of the rela-
tionship between executive pay and ﬁrm performance measured by stock market data. Controlling
for ﬁrm earnings changes results dramatically. Hence empirical ﬁndings based on stock market
data should be treated with caution.
Second, we do not know what determines long-term oriented compensation in German corpora-
tions. We found no impact of ﬁrm performance on long-term pay. One reason could be that our
sample period from 2005 to 2009 is rather short. Maybe long-term oriented compensation can be
better explained with ﬁrm performance measured over several years. We expect additional insights
as a longer period of German compensation data becomes gradually available.
Third, our robustness check for reverse causality is only a ﬁrst step to investigate the impact of
compensation on ﬁrm risk. Stock market volatility is only a very indirect measure for ﬁrm risk
and so far we have no corresponding measure based on accounting data. Conditional on data
24availability we may use risk measures such as leverage or follow the approach of Coles et al.
(2006) who use more direct measures such as R&D expenditures as a measure for managerial risk
taking.
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32Table 11: Distribution of Performance and Risk Measures, 2005-2009
Percentile Stock Return Standard Deviation EBIT Standard Deviation
of Stock Return of EBIT
0 -0.7446 0.0763 -3,515,723 3,035
10 -0.4669 0.1047 -389,746 7,329
20 -0.2634 0.1199 -84,823 11,052
30 -0.1048 0.1379 -20,980 23,273
40 -0.0098 0.1539 -5,179 38,737
50 0.0835 0.1726 3,575 63,231
60 0.1570 0.1898 10,995 131,481
70 0.2844 0.2129 31,506 211,388
80 0.4120 0.2408 86,108 457,612
90 0.5742 0.2839 271,789 1,324,873
100 1.4485 0.5781 1,413,279 13,100,000
Mean 0.0883 0.1891 -59,815 509,238
N 422 422 315 315
Annual stock returns and annual EBIT are taken from Thomson Reuters’ Datastream
database and adjusted for inﬂation. EBIT is the difference in annual EBIT denominated
in thousand Euro. The standard deviation of stock returns is calculated based on weekly re-
turns over the three years preceding the year of the corresponding executive compensation
data. The standard deviation of EBIT is calculated over ten years preceding the year of the
corresponding executive compensation data.
33Table 12: Regression Results based on Stock Market Data, 2005-2009
Stock return 428.0428*** 292.2801** 426.8576*** -42.2592
(3.37) (2.33) (3.30) (-0.35)
Stock return x CDF -792.9117*** -646.2160*** -791.7487*** -255.715
(-4.26) (-3.53) (-4.21) (-1.47)
CDF 105.8291 40.4996 105.4413 -159.1781
(0.79) (0.31) (0.78) (-1.29)
EBIT - - - 0.00013***
(12.54)
2006 132.613** 159.0344** 132.8271** 132.0510**
(2.01) (2.47) (2.01) (2.20)
2007 219.4758*** 242.3266*** 219.6214*** 180.4540**
(2.75) (3.10) (2.74) (2.47)
2008 29.8919 9.2416 29.8679 14.8492
(0.33) (0.10) (0.33) (0.18)
2009 -83.7888 -88.1236 -83.4612 -24.8149
(-1.18) (-1.27) (-1.17) (-0.38)
CEO 759.2219*** 768.7842*** 759.2065*** 691.8889***
(5.74) (5.96) (5.74) (5.75)
Total Assets - -0.000002*** - -0.000002***
(-7.24) (-5.34)
Number of - - -0.0000856 -
Employees (-0.05)
R2:
within 0.0844 0.1285 0.0844 0.2435
overall 0.0477 0.0350 0.0427 0.0033
Observations 1652 1652 1652 1652
Pay-Performance Sensitivities (in thousand EURO)
Median 31.5869 -30.8279 30.9833 -
Estimates are based on a panel regression with executive ﬁxed effects and year dummies. The
dependent variable is total compensation and measured in thousands of 2005 Euros. Stock returns
are annual returns adjusted for inﬂation. CDF is the cumulative distribution function of return
variances. EBIT is the absolute change in annual ﬁrm EBIT. Total Assets and the Number of
Employees are measured at the end of the respective ﬁscal year. CEO is a dummy variable for
all board members that are chief executive ofﬁcer of their ﬁrm. For each estimate t-values are
given in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels of 1, 5 and 10 percent are indicated by ***, ** and *,
respectively. A Median Pay-Performance Sensitivity of 31.5869 indicates that a 1% rise in value
of the frim with median variance in our sample induces an increase in the executive’s income of
roughly 32,000 Euro.
34Table 13: Regression Results based on Accounting Data, 2005-2009
All Executives All Executives All Executives
EBIT 0.0006*** 0.0006*** 0.0007***
(3.16) (3.17) (3.19)
EBIT x CDF -0.0007*** -0.0007*** -0.0007***
(-2.73) (-2.71) (-2.75)
CDF 295.9396 250.4238 286.4512
(0.60) (0.50) (0.58)
2006 226.8426*** 214.6460*** 221.8353***
(3.42) (3.20) (3.29)
2007 385.2464*** 362.9872*** 381.1714***
(5.56) (5.08) (5.45)
2008 322.0082*** 301.7046*** 316.5883***
(4.37) (4.01) (4.24)
2009 268.1467*** 243.3778*** 262.6725***
(3.43) (3.02) (3.31)
CEO 752.7459*** 741.6155*** 750.9882***
(5.73) (5.64) (5.72)
Total Assets - 0.000005 -
(1.26)
Number of - - 0.0006
Employees (0.44)
R2:
within 0.1082 0.1102 0.1084
overall 0.1371 0.2640 0.1929
Observations 1188 1188 1188
Pay-Performance Sensitivities (in EURO)
Median 0.3121 0.3158 0.3188
Estimates are based on a panel regression with executive ﬁxed effects and
year dummies. The dependent variable is total compensation and measured
in thousands of 2005 Euros. EBIT is the difference in ﬁrm EBIT in two
subsequent years adjusted for inﬂation. CDF is the cumulative distribution
function of EBIT volatility measured by the variance over ten years. CEO
is a dummy variable for all board members that are chief executive ofﬁcer
of their ﬁrm. Total Assets and the Number of Employees are measured at
the end of the respective ﬁscal year. For each estimate t-values are given
in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels of 1, 5 and 10 percent are indicated by
***, ** and *, respectively.
A Median Pay-Performance Sensitivity of 0.3121 indicates that a 1,000
Euro rise in EBIT at the ﬁrm with median variance in our sample induces
an increase in the executive’s income of roughly 0.31 Euro.
35Table 14: Regression Results for Compensation Components,
Accounting Data, 2005-2009
Variable Pay Cash Bonus Long-Term
EBIT 0.0005*** 0.0003*** 0.0002
(2.80) (2.91) (1.22)
EBIT x CDF -0.0005** -0.0003* -0.0003
(-2.20) (-1.82) (-1.30)
CDF 266.6614 217.1760 49.4854
(0.57) (0.75) (0.13)
2006 170.2035*** 49.6338 120.5697**
(2.68) (1.28) (2.27)
2007 336.1388*** 203.5059*** 132.6329**
(4.96) (4.91) (2.34)
2008 252.9329*** 157.9087*** 95.0242
(3.55) (3.62) (1.59)
2009 179.0745** 114.6817** 64.3928
(2.35) (2.45) (1.01)
CEO 530.5063*** 416.2276*** 114.2787
(4.26) (5.46) (1.10)
Total Assets 1.23e-06 -4.90e-06** 6.13e-06**
(0.36) (-2.30) (2.11)
R2:
within 0.0922 0.1483 0.0260
overall 0.1638 0.0016 0.0835
Observations 1188 1188 1188
Pay-Performance Sensitivities (in EURO)
Median 0.2859 0.2148 -
Estimates are based on a panel regression with executive ﬁxed effects
and year dummies. The dependent variables are different compensa-
tion components in thousands of 2005 Euros and are given in the ﬁrst
line of the table. EBIT is the difference in ﬁrm EBIT in two subse-
quent years adjusted for inﬂation. CDF is the cumulative distribution
function of EBIT volatility measured by the variance over ten years.
CEO is a dummy variable for all board members that are chief ex-
ecutive ofﬁcer of their ﬁrm. Total Assets are measured at the end
of the respective ﬁscal year. For each estimate t-values are given in
parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels of 1, 5 and 10 percent are indicated
by ***, ** and *, respectively.
A Median Pay-Performance Sensitivity of 0.2859 indicates that a
1,000 Euro rise in EBIT at the ﬁrm with median variance in our sam-
ple induces an increase in the executive’s income of roughly 0.29
Euro.
36Table 15: Robustness Check with Stock Market Data, 2005-2009
Individual FE Firm FE Industry FE
Stock return 436.0116*** 268.7151* 444.8468**
(4.22) (1.81) (2.23)
Stock return x Variance -3846.7830** - -
(-2.35)
Variance 1855.9620 - -
(1.36)
Stock return x CDF - -604.45*** -772.9727***
(-2.81) (-2.72)
CDF - 24.1635 -1345.558***
(0.17) (-10.83)
2006 210.7262*** 149.7875** -213.7624**
(4.09) (2.02) (-2.11)
2007 394.8226*** 234.9747*** -422.6764***
(7.09) (2.68) (-3.88)
2008 210.7262*** -13.4891 -659.3406***
(4.09) (-0.13) (-5.14)
2009 394.8226*** -134.1637* -473.3100***
(7.09) (-1.81) (-4.74)
CEO 818.5794*** 1041.3110*** 856.5778***
(4.87) (23.09) (13.37)
Total Assets - -0.000002*** 0.000003***
(-6.04) (13.57)
Observations 1652 1652 1652
R2:
within 0.1828 0.2922 0.2523
overall 0.0294 0.0109 0.3103
Pay-Performance Sensitivities (in thousand EURO)
Median -33.5099 58.3605
Estimates are based on a panel regression with ﬁxed effects and year dummies. The
dependent variable is total compensation and measured in thousands of 2005 Euros.
Stock returns are annual returns adjusted for inﬂation. Variance is the variance of
stock returns measured over 36 monthly observations of stock returns. CDF is the
cumulative distribution function of return variances. Total Assets are measured at the
end of the respective ﬁscal year. CEO is a dummy variable for all board members
that are chief executive ofﬁcer of their ﬁrm. Total Assets is measured at the end of
the respective ﬁscal year. For each estimate t-values are given in parentheses. Signif-
icance levels of 1, 5 and 10 percent are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively.
The Minimum and Maximum Pay-Performance Sensitivities correspond to the obser-
vationwiththehighestandlowestvariance, respectively. AMedianPay-Performance
Sensitivity of 58.3605 indicates that a 1% rise in ﬁrm value induces an increase in the
executive’s income of roughly 58,000 Euro.
37Table 16: Robustness Check with Accounting Data, 2005-2009
Individual FE Firm FE Industry FE
EBIT 0.000006 0.0007*** 0.0007**
(0.07) (2.74) (2.12)
EBIT x Variation -0.000002 - -
(0.41)
Variation -0.1801 - -
(-0.43)
EBIT x CDF - -0.0007** -0.0008**
(-2.39) (-2.00)
CDF - 55.8459 2119.0520***
(0.10) (15.00)
2006 203.312*** 203.8864** 152.9426
(2.71) (2.47) (1.47)
2007 301.6108*** 333.3375*** 211.0191**
(3.76) (3.98) (2.07)
2008 180.8803** 231.6710*** -7.525
(2.13) (2.70) (-0.07)
2009 152.9226*** 152.9226** -148.0141
(2.71) (1.72) (-1.44)
CEO 886.2917*** 1070.4590*** 957.3628***
(4.87) (21.49) (15.16)
Total Assets 0.00002** 0.000003 0.000006***
(1.55) (0.10) (6.77)
Observations 790 1188 1188
R2:
within 0.1051 0.3079 0.4024
overall 0.2057 0.1502 0.3770
Pay-Performance Sensitivities (in EURO)
Median - 0.3307 0.2923
Estimates are based on a panel regression with ﬁxed effects and year dummies.
The dependent variable is total compensation and measured in thousands of
2005 Euros. EBIT is the difference in ﬁrm EBIT in two subsequent years
adjusted for inﬂation. Variation is EBIT volatility measured by the coefﬁcient
of variation over 10 years. CDF is the cumulative distribution function of
EBIT volatility measured by the coefﬁcient of variation. CEO is a dummy
variable for all board members that are chief executive ofﬁcer of their ﬁrm.
Total Assets is measured at the end of the respective ﬁscal year. For each
estimate t-values are given in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels of 1, 5 and 10
percent are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively.
The Minimum and Maximum Pay-Performance Sensitivities correspond to the
observation with the highest and lowest variation, respectively. A Median Pay-
Performance Sensitivity of 0.3307 indicates that a 1,000 Euro rise in EBIT
induces an increase in the executive’s income of roughly 0.33 Euro.
38Table 17: Reverse Causality, 2006-2009
Variance of Stock Return Stock Return
Pay-Performance 0.000042** -0.0003
Sensitivity (2.51) (-0.72)














Estimates are based on a panel regression with ﬁrm ﬁxed effects and year dummies.
The dependent variables are the variance of stock returns and stock returns of the
respective ﬁrms. Stock returns are calculated as the stock price at the end of the
ﬁscal year divided by the stock price at the beginning of the ﬁscal year. The vari-
ance is estimated with weekly data over one year. Pay-Performance Sensitivity is
the estimated Euro amount an executive receives for a one percent increase in ﬁrm
value. Total Pay is the average amount board members of the respective ﬁrms earn
in a given year. Pay-Performance Sensitivity and Total Pay are lagged one period.
For each estimate t-values are given in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels of 1, 5 and
10 percent are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively.
39